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FOOL FOR A CLIENT: SOME REFLECTIONS
ON REPRESENTING THE PRESIDENT
MargaretRaymond'
INTRODUCTION

W

all heard the old joke. You're in a room with a poisonous
snake, a vicious lion, and a lawyer, and your gun has only two
bullets. What should you do? The answer, of course, is to shoot the
lawyer twice.
Much of the commentary about the lawyers who represented Bill
Clinton in the Paula Jones matter and the Independent Counsel investigation sounds a bit like shooting the lawyer twice. Regardless of
whether particular commentators disliked the sometimes lame and
painfully legalistic defenses offered by Clinton's counsel,' or felt, by
contrast, that his lawyers had not been aggressive enough,2 pretty
E'VE

* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to the American Bar Association for the opportunity to participate on this panel at the 1999 National Conference on Professional Responsibility and to Bruce Greene for comments
on a preliminary draft of this Article.
1. See e.g., Ruth Marcus, Second-Guessing Clinton's Defense, Wash. Post, Sept.
16,1998, at A31 (citing lawyers who faulted David Kendall, Clinton's outside counsel
in the impeachment inquiry, for, inter alia, "pursuing a legalistic argument-that receiving oral sex did not constitute a sexual relationship-that found few takers," and
one lawyer who argued that the lawyers had failed to "help the guy [Clinton] look at
the bigger picture"); David Margolick, Like Sex Acts, Lawyer's Job is a Matter of
Definition, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1998, at B7 (referring to "the President's highly legalistic defense"); Robert D. Novak, Triumph of the Hair-Splitters,N.Y. Post, Jan. 25,
1999, at 27 ("[Clinton's] ... lawyers have been engaged in a year-long debate .. over
whether to emphasize contrition and seek the nation's mercy or instead employ slashand-burn tactics practiced at the elite Williams & Connolly law firm .... [H]airsplitting... long has characterized the Kendall-led Clinton team.").
2. One prominent critic was Alan Dershowitz, who commented that Robert
Bennett's representation of Mr. Clinton in the Jones matter "qualifies as among the
worst legal blunders of the 20th century." Marcus, supra note 1. Dershowitz argued,
inter alia, that it was inexcusable to allow Clinton to testify in the Jones deposition
rather than defaulting in the case. See, e.g., Peter Aronson, Dershowitz Goes After
Bennett... And the President Responds to the Opinionated Prof., Nat'l LJ., Feb. 15,
1999, at Al (noting that Dershowitz argued that Bennett "walked the president into a
peijury trap by allowing him to testify about his sex life during the Jones deposition").
Implicit in the critique was the contention that Bennett failed to investigate the case
adequately. See id; see also Letter by Alan Dershowitz, Dershowitz Says Bob Bennett
Dropped the Ball, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 22, 1999, at A24 (indicating that Bennett failed to
explore the default option and fully investigate Ms. Lewinsky's testimony). Ted Olson, in turn, defended Bennett. See Letter by Theodore B. Olson, Ted Olson Defends
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much everyone agreed that whatever it was that was wrong, it was the

lawyers' fault.3

Robert Bennett, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 1999, at A27 (arguing that Bennett could not respond to Dershowitz's allegations because of confidentiality and privilege). Mr. Oson concluded that "Mr. Dershowitz has spent too much time watching himself on
television." ld. But there were other critics as well. See, e.g., Greg Gordon, Bad Legal
Decisions Costly for President,News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 18, 1998, at
A12 (quoting Professor Steven Lubet as saying that counsel should have instructed
Clinton to decline to answer questions about Monica Lewinsky at the Jones deposition on the grounds the questions inquired into his private life). Professor Lubet also
criticized Bennett for asking clarifying questions about the president's denial of a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky, claiming that Bennett had violated "[o]ne of
the cardinal rules of defending a deposition.... [which is] that you don't ask unnecessary questions of your own client." Id.; see also Adam Pertman, Against Pros, House
Managers Faced "Mismatch" Lawyers Say, Boston Globe, Feb. 12, 1999, at A18
("[N]early all observers agree he [Mr. Clinton] probably could have escaped the entire impeachment drama if his initial private lawyer, Robert Bennett, had persuaded
Clinton to plead the Fifth Amendment rather than provide any substantive testimony
during the Paula Jones civil suit."); Letter by Michael Riikola, A Third Strategy Could
Have Saved Clinton, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 1, 1999, at A20. Riikola contends that counsel
should have instructed Clinton not to answer questions about Monica Lewinsky in the
Jones deposition, should have sought interlocutory review of any order compelling
such testimony, and should have persisted in the refusal even if the court struck his
answer as a result, and notes:
It is appalling that Yale Law School could produce a lawyer in Mr. Clinton
who is so naive as not to understand the rudiments of civil discovery, and
worse yet that Bob Bennett could allow his client to undergo the worst possible suffering for no good reason and then try to rationalize it by invoking
privilege.
Id.
Mr. Bennett was not the only lawyer subjected to criticism. Others criticized David
Kendall "for not having his client come forward with the truth earlier, for letting him
testify before the grand jury, [and] for allowing him to dig himself into even deeper
legal trouble with his grand jury answers." Marcus, supra note 1.
3. See Margolick, supra note 1 ("[W]hen blame for the Monica Lewinsky matter
is apportioned, the finger-pointing goes in another direction: towards Mr. Clinton's
lawyers."); see also Maureen Dowd, Power of Attorney, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1998, §
4, at 15. Dowd comments:
It was inevitable, of course, that lawyers would destroy civilization .....
[I]t's top-flight lawyers who bollix up everything and make a ton of
money doing it....
The capital is in a titanic twilight struggle between armies of lawyers ....
The First Lawyers owe more than $6 million to lawyers who have given them
bad legal advice and allowed Mr. Clinton to turn his White House into a lying machine for seven months and dodge behind silly, tortured legalisms
about sex.
Id.
The White House "even has spinner lawyers to put the best light on stupid things
the lawyers are doing." Id.; Richard Louv, Clinton in Crisis: Issues That Will Outlive
the Clinton Controversy, San Diego Union-Trib., Sept. 30, 1998, at A3 ("To some of
us, Clinton seems less a congenital liar than a congenital lawyer. His highly legalistic
defense, "'using a tortured definition of sex that has earned him great ridicule,' could
be related to the training that elite lawyers now get. ... " (quoting David Margolick,
supra note 1)); Cynthia Tucker, Clinton Must Cut to Chase, New Orleans TimesPicayune, Feb. 1, 1999, at B5 ("A lawyer himself, he [Clinton] surrounded himself
with other shortsighted lawyers... who made legalistic decisions that served the
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We must, however, acknowledge the possibility that the lawyering
in this case had very little to do with the lawyers What if the client
himself was largely in control of his representation, controlling the

flow of information to his lawyers with at least some awareness of the
consequences that the limited information he allowed them might

have for the course of the matter? What if the client, in effect, chose

to represent himself? I don't mean in the Farettav California5 sense,

but in the sense of making conscious decisions, with known consequences, to limit the information shared with the lawyers and, in turn,

their ability to control and direct the representation. This Article addresses the lessons to be learned by lawyers from the Independent

Counsel's investigation of President Clinton as well as from the Paula
Jones matter. In Part I, President Clinton's behavior is considered in

light of the behavior of former President Nixon. Part II discusses the
tendency of powerful and sophisticated clients to engage in self-

representation. Part III examines a lawyer's ethical obligations to a
client who engages in self-representation. The Article suggests that

the Clinton experience, rather than providing a lesson for lawyers,
provides, perhaps, a lesson for clients who systematically ignore their
lawyer's advice, pursuing their own course of action during their representation.
I.

THE NIXON EXPERIENCE

We know that some decisions made in Mr. Clinton's representation
were problematic, as indicated by the finding of the district court
president poorly."); see also Jon Shure, O.J.'s Defender Plays Monday-Morning
Quarterback, Newark Star-Ledger, Dec. 9, 1999, at 6 (commenting on Alan Dershowitz's critique of Robert Bennett discussed supra note 2 and noting that "Dershowitz reserves his most withering criticism ... not for Clinton but for Clinton's lawyer. ...").

4. Others have made this suggestion. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 2 (arguing that

Bennett could not respond to Dershowitz's allegations because of confidentiality and

privilege).
Representing President Clinton in the Jones case had to have been one nasty
little surprise after another. But Mr. Bennett won the Jones case. It was the
president who lied in his deposition, erected a wall of falsehoods to mislead
the Jones lawyers and scrambled like a cheap thief to hide all the shabby
evidence. The president has no one to blame for his impeachment but his
own unmanageable impulses and unprincipled defenses.
Id.; see also Marcus, supra note 1 (noting that "[s]ome cautioned against assigning
fault to the lawyers" because "it was impossible to know whether Clinton had heeded
their advice," and because "legal advice can only be as good as the information on
which it is based, and that it was clear the president had been misleading and dishonest with his lawyers ....).
5. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Faretta deals with the constitutional right to selfrepresentation. While "self-represented" defendants often are assigned advisory
counsel by the courts to assist them in preparing for court proceedings, I do not mean
to suggest that Mr. Clinton's situation is a case of constitutionally privileged "selfrepresentation." See Paul H. Byrtus, Pro Se Defendants and Advisory Counsel, 14
Land & Water L. Rev. 227,229 (1979).
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holding Mr. Clinton in civil contempt of the United States District
Court for lying in his deposition in Jones v. Clinton.6 Identifying the
players who made those decisions is a different task, and one that is
difficult to accomplish. Needless to say, we can't know what happened in the context of Mr. Clinton's relationship with his lawyers.
That information is shielded by confidentiality and privilege, and it
should be, not least because it makes it so interesting for us to surmise
on limited information.
But we can look to roughly comparable situations, the most obvious
comparison being Richard Nixon.8 The advantage here, of course, is
extensive memoirs by some of the participants concerned, which shed

some light on the nature of the relationship between Nixon and his
lawyers. 9 The story told by Nixon and by one of his lawyers is strikingly similar to President Clinton's. 10 It suggests that Nixon retained
6. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1127 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (finding that "the record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the President responded to plaintiff's
questions by giving false, misleading and evasive answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process"); see also Suzanne Garment, Refreshing Ruling Blows
Away the "Is, Is" Smoke, L.A. Times, Apr. 18, 1999, at M1 ("The president lied. Not
great lies for reasons of state, the kind we must forgive, but little, low, rotten, squirmy
lies of the sort that small boys tell for no reason higher than to protect themselves
from deserved punishment.").
7. In Bob Woodward, Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate
(1999), Woodward suggests that Clinton did not trust his lawyers. During his years in
the White House, Clinton had become increasingly isolated, to the point where he
would not even confide in his own lawyers, despite their entreaties, nor be truthful
with them. See id. at 515-16; see, e.g., id. at 259 (reporting that Clinton told Bennett he
was "retired" from pursuing women); id. at 361 (reporting thorough questioning by
Bennett about Monica Lewinsky, to which Clinton responded untruthfully). But
Woodward's book is not a firsthand account, and his sources are not attributed. His
account must, therefore, be viewed with some skepticism pending further development of the historical record.
8. In treating Nixon's situation as comparable to Clinton's, I express no opinion
about whether the wrongdoing involved in the Clinton situation was or was not of
comparable seriousness to that involved in the Watergate cover-up. The similarity
that interests me here is how a beleaguered president, whose political survival is
threatened, shapes the relationship with his legal advisers.
9. Before we proceed with the discussion of what we know about Nixon's lawyers, an interesting question is whether it was proper for us to learn about it. Leonard
Garment, in his memoir Crazy Rhythm, discusses at some length his representation of
Nixon as White House counsel, including verbatim reports of Nixon's statements to
him and discussions of strategy, tactics, and advice. See Leonard Garment, Crazy
Rhythm 245-302 (1997). Whether Garment obtained Nixon's express consent to publish the book before Nixon's death, or felt that the 1978 publication of Nixon's memoirs in effect opened the attorney-client relationship to the public view, is unclear.
Garment does not discuss the matter in his book.
10. One might expect after-the-fact retellings to have something of a fingerpointing quality. These do, but only in the most limited contexts-namely, the disagreement about whether the tapes should have been destroyed, which Nixon says he
avoided on Garment's advice, while Garment argues that Nixon, conscious of his role
in history, did not want to destroy them and would not have done so regardless of legal advice. See id. at 281-82. But the sense of the distribution of authority and information in the lawyer-client relationship comes through consistently in both versions.
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control of his representation, limiting and rationing the information
available to his lawyers and making decisions himself based on his
own assessment of the legal and factual significance of particular facts
and circumstances.
What did the lawyers say about the relationship? While White
House counsel and an associated group of government lawyers represented the interests of the Presidency, Nixon, early on, resisted entreaties to hire private outside counsel to represent him as an individual. He decided, instead, in the words of White House counsel
Leonard Garment, "to manage his Watergate defense personally. He
would be his own lawyer ....
,
Having made the decision to control his own defense, Nixon also
controlled the information available to his legal team. Most notable
was his treatment of the White House taping system and the audiotapes of critical conversations that had taken place in the White
House. Nixon ordered Alexander Haig, then White House Chief of
Staff, to withhold from the lawyers the existence of the White House
taping system.'2 Ultimately, Garment indicates, it became apparent to
the lawyers that "Nixon... had a secret cache of information that he
would not show us, and increasingly it seemed probable to Fred [Buzhardt] and me that this information was of the type that might compromise our ability to represent him in court and in public if we knew
its nature."' Perhaps that explains the fact that, while the two apparently agreed that Nixon "must have had a large cache of tapes that he
was using selectively to 'refresh' his recollection," they evidently did
not press the President to disclose to them what he knew. 4 Only on
July 10, 1973, after John Dean had already testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, was the existence of the secret White House
taping system fully disclosed to Garment, then counsel to the President. 5
The result of Nixon's reluctance to make full disclosure to his law11. Id. at 268. Garment went on to say that Nixon planned to proceed, "working

principally through Haig and doling out spoonfuls of time and information to Buzhardt and [Garment] while conferring personally and at length with the private lawyers for ex-aides H. R. [Bob] Haldeman and John Ehrlichman and with Haldeman
himself." Id.at 268. Al Haig, then chief of staff, "was the principal communications
link between Nixon and his lawyers." Id. at 266. Nixon in fact proceeded on this tack.
At the same time that Garment was agreeing to take on Watergate as counsel to the
president, Nixon was meeting with other advisers to devise strategies for addressing
Watergate. Garment was not told of these meetings and was not a participant in
them. See id. at 256. It was not until December 1973 that Nixon engaged outside
counsel James St. Clair. See id. at 291.
12- See id. at 271.
13. Id. Fred Buzhardt was special counsel for Watergate affairs. See Ken Gormley, Archibald Cox 274 (1997). Buzhardt and Garment began to suspect that "Nixon,
in revising our drafts, was consulting extracts from tape recordings." Garment, supra
note 9, at 271.
14. Garment, supra note 9, at 271.
15. See id. at 275.
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yers, in Garment's view, was to "isolate him from his so-called advisers and make us powerless to give sensible advice. 1

6

Nor did the law-

yers press the president for details; Buzhardt, in Garment's words,
"tiptoe[d] through the evidence with Nixon, accepting detailed representations of fact without pressing Nixon about their source. 17 Even
at the point when the existence of the tapes had been disclosed and
the President's legal advisors were considering how to proceed with
them, the legal team had still not heard any of the critical tapes;"

when the decision was made to turn over the subpoenaed tapes, Garment still had not heard any of them. 9

Nixon's own account is in many respects similar to Garment's.
Early discussions of ways to contain the Watergate situation, discussed in his Memoirs,2 did not include counsel.2 Nixon did not consuit with White House Counsel John Dean on the matter, expecting
others to do so and desiring only that Dean be admonished "not to
contrive a story that might not succeed."'
Nixon, by his own account, was unquestionably in control in his relations with his lawyers. He comments at one point that the cover
story for payments to the Watergate burglars would be that a "Cuban
committee" had "taken care of the defendants."'
Told by Dean
"[t]hat isn't of course quite the way it happened," Nixon responded, "I
know, but it's the way it's going to have to happen. '24 Throughout the
investigation, Nixon relied on his own legal judgments.25 While ap16. Id. at 272.
17. Id. at 271.
18. "[Njone of us, as far as I know, had heard any of the tapes with the possible
exception of Buzhardt who might have heard fragments. ..

."

Id. at 278.

19. See id. at 288. Garment hypothesizes that Nixon's attempt to control the situation accounted for the way Nixon sounded on the tapes; "one reason why the Nixon
of the Watergate tapes sounds so wandering, repetitious, contradictory, and at times
almost incoherent" was that he "was aware of where he was heading and created a
smoke screen of circumlocution so that nobody else would see his design." Id. at 258.
20. Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (1978).
21. These included the suggestions that "every time the Democrats accused us of
bugging we should charge that we were being bugged and maybe even plant a bug and
find it ourselves!" id. at 637, suggestions that the break-in could be explained as a
"Cuban story," id. at 638, as well as the "smoking gun" proposal to have CIA director
Richard Helms ask the Acting Director of the FBI, Patrick Gray, to stop the investigation by claiming falsely that it would impinge on CIA interests. See id. at 640.
22. Id. at 661.
23. Id. at 797.
24. Id. Nixon also stated that everyone should agree that payments to the Watergate defendants were not used to obstruct justice-"I don't mean a lie, but a line." Id.
at 825.
25. See, e.g., id. at 807 (noting in his diary that "there might not be any legal basis
for prosecution for people paying blackmail"); id. at 821 ("I still could not believe that
the prosecutors could charge Haldeman and Ehrlichman with conspiracy simply because they had been asked whether it was all right to raise the money [for the Watergate defendants] in the first place"); id. at 826 (noting charges leveled by Richard
Kleindienst based on statements by John Dean "did not seem to me to be sufficient
evidence to indict either [Haldeman or Ehrlichman]"); id. at 832 ("I told myself that I
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parently cognizant of the value of counsel,26 Nixon rarely listened to
the advice of lawyers!' It is almost astonishing now to consider how
little lawyering Nixon received. 8
A stingy and selective sharer of information, Nixon appears to have
been unwilling to disclose the critical facts to his lawyers. Again, the
treatment of the tapes stands out. Nixon identified a number of conversations that were likely to be of concern. 9 But he kept them to
had not been involved in the things that gave them [Haldeman and Ehrlichman] potential criminal vulnerability."). Nixon also refers to his discussion style-thinking "a
problem through out loud, even considering totally unacceptable alternatives in the
process of ruling them out" as "a lawyer's typical mental exercise." Id. at 843. For
another example of Nixon relying on his own legal judgment, see Garment, supra
note 9, at 276-77. Garment reports that in his Memoirs, Nixon claimed shock that any
witness would disclose the existence of the taping system rather than invoking executive privilege. See id. at 276. Garment notes:
I do not believe such a claim would have had the slightest legal merit; but
this is an academic judgment, since none of the White House lawyers ever
had the opportunity to discuss options before the crisis was upon us. If there
had been reasonably open communications between the president and us,
we would at least have had time to canvass the possibilities. But there
wasn't and we didn't.
Id. at 276-77.
26. Nixon observes that when Ehrlichman took over the authority for handling
Watergate from Dean, Ehrlichman, "[i]n order to establish a lawyer-client privilege ... drew up a letter for me to sign, officially charging him with these responsibilities." Nixon, supra note 20, at 812.
27. The first reference in the Memoirs to outside counsel in connection with Watergate is a discussion of a request to have a lawyer, Chappie Rose, meet with Nixon
"to give [him] some outside counsel." Id. at 839. The meeting is hardly a classic attorney-client conversation. It was Pat Buchanan who "summarized the options" at the
meeting. The advice that Rose gave-that requiring the premature resignation of
Haldeman and Ehrlichman might prejudice their rights-was disregarded. See id.
28. Nixon noted that a staff of fewer than 10 lawyers assisted him, including Fred
Buzhardt, Len Garment, Professor Charles Alan Wright on a part-time basis, and
several young lawyers. See id. at 873; see also Garment, supra note 9, at 264 ("There
was, sad to say, not a single experienced criminal defense lawyer in the 'firm.'").
Nixon's private counsel, James St. Clair, was not engaged until late 1973. See Nixon,
supra note 20, at 973. Nixon commented: "[W]e were like a high school team heading
into the Super Bowl." ld. at 873. According to Garment, the lack of a large legal team
was partly "appearances: The president had proclaimed his innocence and presumably did not need a large legal team." Garment, supra note 9, at 267. Another reason
was Nixon's unwillingness to trust a private law firm with presidential confidences.
See id But the willingness to proceed without private counsel is surely a reflection of
a different era. When Alex Butterfield was called before the full Senate committee to
testify about the White House taping system, he asked Garment whether Garment
would represent him. Garment explained that he could not, for "technical conflict
reasons," but that "he didn't really need a lawyer. Since he was going to be on national television, it was more important for him to get a good haircut." Id. at 277.
29. One was the March 21, 1973 conversation with John Dean in which Dean
warned Nixon that knowledge of the break-in and active involvement in the coverup
extended deeply into the White House, the so-called "cancer" close to the presidency
discussion. See Nixon, supra note 20, at 791. Another was the June 23, 1972 conversation with Haldeman in which the two discussed the possibility of deflecting the FBI's
investigation of the break-in by getting the CIA director to ask the FBI's acting director to desist by claiming falsely that the break-in was a CIA operation. See id. at 639-
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himself and to his political advisers, rather than sharing them with the
lawyers,3" who first listened to those tapes only after their client, had
already been ordered by the Supreme Court to produce them.3 The
lawyers, it appears, did not insist on being apprised of all the facts, and
the client most certainly did not offer to convey them. Either way, the
dynamic of the relationship was hardly the sought-after model of full
disclosure and considered advice. Like many clients, Nixon did not
trust lawyers, because he believed his lawyers did not understand what
to him was the essentially political nature of the controversy. 2 He
used different advisors in different contexts to play various strategic
roles-a political skill he would naturally bring to his own selfdefense. But the Nixon case is a persuasive example of a situation in
which a president, as a client, was routinely engaged in selfrepresentation.
II. CLIENT SELF-REPRESENTATION
The tendency of presidents to engage in self-representation suggests
three things. The first is that we may not be able to apply ordinary
models of attorney-client relations to lawyers who represent the
President.3 3 Highly knowledgeable, highly powerful, and cognizant
40.
30. On June 4, 1973, he reports having listened to tapes of his conversations with
Dean. See id. at 874. He concluded from this that the tapes proved Dean was lying
and that "'the goddamn record is not bad."' Id. at 875; see also id. at 902 (noting that
he thought the tapes were "insurance"). Counsel, by contrast, did not hear any of the
tapes until after the Supreme Court had ordered Nixon to produce the tapes on July
24, 1974. See id. at 1051-52. After listening to the tape of the June 23, 1972, conversation with Haldeman, Buzhardt told Nixon that in his view the tape was the "'smoking
gun."' Id. James St. Clair, Nixon's private defense counsel, first listened to the tape
on Tuesday, July 30, 1974. See id. at 1055.
Nixon's after-the-fact judgment was that this was error. "Now I can see that I
should have asked Buzhardt to listen to all three June conversations with Haldeman,
give me his independent judgment on them, and then have put them out." Id. at 1001.
But the contemporaneous reporting tells quite another story. Nixon noted: "So the
tapes sat there in the EOB ....[t]he ones I had already reviewed were bad enough;
now what might be on the others haunted us all." Id. at 975. Notwithstanding his
fears about what the tapes contained, the legwork of plowing through the tapes and
figuring out what the record showed was not entrusted to the lawyers.
31. See supra note 30.
32. In his view, Watergate was "an annoying and strictly political problem."
Nixon, supra note 20, at 646; see also id. at 834 (Nixon treated Dean's report that
there was a "cancer" near the presidency and that the Watergate coverup was too
close to the President as a purely political problem; "I contemplated buying time with
one more payment to Hunt and calmly analyzed the political problems involved in
granting clemency to the defendants after the 1974 election."). Moreover, the lawyers
did not understand his view of the situation as quintessentially a political rather than
legal one; "'St. Clair,"' Nixon wrote in a contemporaneous note, "'sees [impeachment] too much as a trial, not [as] a public relations exercise. We must work on him
to get him to understand what we are up against."' Id. at 990.
33. That the president is a unique client is widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Marcus,
supra note 1 ("The [P]resident of the United States is a uniquely difficult client to ad-
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first and foremost of the political consequences of their legal situations, presidents are simply not typical clients. While that may be
true, it is not a matter of much consequence. Very few lawyers have
the opportunity to represent the President of the United States
(though such representation may be becoming something of a growth
industry).
The second point, more significant for this discussion, is that we
ought to be very careful about drawing conclusions about what is
wrong with lawyering in the United States from observing the way Bill
Clinton's lawyers behaved in the Monica Lewinsky matter. 4 Lawyers
representing such uniquely situated clients, who are likely to be directing their own representation to a significant degree, may not be
responsible for everything that happens in such representation. At
the very least, they do not present examples about which we can easily
generalize.
The third point is that perhaps this self-representation model goes
beyond presidents, and that we ought therefore to examine with more
care the obligations of the lawyer representing a knowledgeable and
sophisticated client. Such clients, whether corporate CEOs or cabinet
secretaries, have a knowledge base, a power base, and a set of interests to protect that may create a different dynamic between lawyer
and client-and in turn require some different responses.
Existing codes of ethics do not help us much with the complex dynamics of the lawyer's relationship with a powerful and sophisticated
client. To the extent the ethical rules reflect a vision of the attorneyclient relationship, it is a monolithic-and admittedly simplistic-notion that lawyers are knowledgeable and clients are naive3 5 The privise."); see also Gordon, supra note 2, at A12 (quoting Professor Steven Lubet as
saying, "'It must be tough to have the president of the United States as [your] client.
Ordinarily, you have a great deal of control over your client. But when your client is

the most powerful person in the world, I think there's a different set of priorities.'").

34. Thus I question the wisdom of commentary like that of William Glaberson:
"President Clinton's troubles have ignited a new and broader debate about the role of
lawyers in American society.... Whether lawyers and their wvay of thinking have become so pervasive that legalistic gamesmanship is dominating politics-and, perhaps,
everyday life." William Glaberson, Legal Gamesmanship May Take Toll, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 24 1998, at A22. Glaberson quotes Professor Daniel R. Fischel as drawing some
sweeping conclusions: "[T]he Monica Lewinsky battle seemed to highlight a growing
worry about whether the lawyerly ideal of prevailing by destroying the opposition had
pushed aside other American values like trust and cooperation." Id. Glaberson goes
on to quote a similarly broad statement by Dean Ronald A. Cass: "One legacy of the
Lewinsky era is sure to be a re-examination of the influence of lawyers on the country.... 'The question... will be whether lawyers are serving any real purpose in life
or whether lawyers are simply engaging in semantic arguments that don't make sense
to ordinary people."' Id
35. Others have commented about the simplifying and simplistic assumptions inherent in a unitary view of the relationship between lawyers and clients. See, eg.,
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers? 105 Harv. L Rev. 799, 816 (1992)
(noting that the assumption that "the client is incapable of understanding and evaluating lawyer conduct... fails to capture the complexity of contemporary legal prac-

860

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

mary concern reflected by the Model Rules is that lawyers will use
their power over their clients to dominate the lawyer-client relation-

ship inappropriately. 6 The "normal relationship" envisioned by the
Model Rules37 is one in which the lawyer clearly takes the lead, educating and assisting the client to enable him to make those decisions
that are properly his to make. 8
We assume client naivete in other contexts, as well. The volumi-

nous literature about client perjury, for example, assumes this same
unschooled client. The only client who will create a problem for his
lawyer by telling him one set of facts and then seeking to testify to another-the classic perjury paradigm-is a client who doesn't know
tice" (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law 140 (1978) (footnote omitted) (arguing that "relations between corporate clients and their attorneys
often differ significantly from the stereotypical interactions contemplated in the traditional model of legal ethics")). Professor Wilkins notes later on that "[c]ertain individual clients undoubtedly will have more in common with the average corporation
than with other individuals." Id. at 819; see also Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal
Distinctionin ProfessionalResponsibility, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 165, 186 (1996)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Civil-Criminal Distinction] ("One of the modem criticisms
leveled at the professional codes is that they fail adequately to distinguish among
categories of lawyers or contexts of lawyering."). Professor Fred Zacharias has argued extensively that many arguments for a strong advocacy model of lawyering are
based on a faulty paradigm of the typical criminal defense client. See, e.g., Fred C.
Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 169, 186 (1997)
[hereinafter Zacharias, ReconceptualizingRoles] ("The criminal defense paradigm...
posits an individual, relatively unsophisticated client facing overwhelming government resources."); see also Zacharias, Civil-CriminalDistinction, supra, at 169 ("The
criminal defendant typically is characterized as scared, unintelligent, unfamiliar with
the system and his surroundings (e.g., jail), and unsophisticated about law."); id. at
182 (arguing that the criminal paradigm "assumes an unintelligent, or at least unsophisticated, client who is unable to navigate the legal system; in essence, one who
cannot make reasonable decisions effectuating his rights unless his lawyer serves as
his alter ego"). Professor Zacharias proceeds to question the paradigm and its implication for "superaggressive lawyering," in favor of treating categories of clients differently. See id. at 167-71, 181. Zacharias notes that while this paradigm does not fit
all criminal defense situations, "[tihese issues are magnified when one considers how
civil clients and varying kinds of civil representation may differ from the criminal defense paradigm," Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Roles, supra, at 187, and that "when
ethics standards depend on a highly individualistic, personal vision of clients-like the
criminal paradigm-that vision will prove untrue in many contexts." Id. at 189.
36. The need to control this possibility is demonstrated by Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1998), which requires the lawyer to abide by a client's decisions with regard to certain critical issues in the representation; see also Jan Ellen
Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client. What the Model Rules Say and
Don't Say, 9 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 241, 246 (1998) ("Many well-intentioned lawyers
have paternalistic instincts even when dealing with capable clients. With such broad
authority, there is a great temptation to simply take over.").
37. This relationship is mentioned in Model Rule 1.14, which deals with clients
under a disability. The rule requires a lawyer who is representing such a client to, as
far as reasonably possible, "maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14.
38. See id. Rule 1.14 cmt. 1 ("[T]he normal client-lawyer relationship is based on
the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of
making decisions about important matters.").
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that this course of conduct will create a conflict with the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality. Attempts to "educate" the client about this
obligation are criticized on the basis that they create a sophisticated
client who is knowledgeable enough to tell the lawyer what the lawyer
wants to hear and to conceal from the lawyer those facts that will render the client better off if the lawyer does not know. By telling the
client what the rules are, you suggest to him what the most optimal
answers would be; warning a client about the lawyer's obligation in
the face of false testimony protects the lawyer, but perhaps at the client's expense. It is argued in opposition to claims that counsel should
advise clients of the consequences of telling the lawyer of intended
perjury that the lawyer giving such a warning is, in effect, abandoning
the client to self-representation, requiring him to self-edit and report
to the lawyer only what the client thinks the lawyer wants to hear.
How, then, should we deal with the client who comes to the representation as a highly knowledgeable and powerful strategic thinker,
likely to feel himself confident and competent at managing his own
representation, equipped with knowledge about many matters of
which we assume clients are ignorant in the ordinary course? 39 In light
of this knowledge, this client might make several choices that will
have a substantial impact on the process of his representation. He
might, for example, choose to tailor or alter facts told to his lawyer,
withhold selected evidence, mislead the investigation, or tamper with
witnesses. He might do this because he wants the lawyer to have a
certain vision of the facts. He might do this because he understands
the lawyer's obligation to disclose testimony the lawyer knows to be
perjurious, and he sees the potential need to offer perjured testimony
down the line. He might do this because he wants the lawyer to proceed to develop the case in a certain direction-one the lawyer is less
likely to pursue if he knows all the information the client has to share.
He might do this because he is engaging in self-delusion. He might
also do this because he perceives it as a strategic way of dealing with
what he views as his primary problem, which he may view as a political, business, or personal problem rather than a legal one.
This description sounds like the typical criminal defense client. But
this client is different-or thinks he is. This is because he understands-or believes he does-the consequences of his choices. He has
made a conscious decision not to rely on the advice of his lawyer. He
is, in some significant respect, representing himself.

39. The idea that we might consider applying different categories of ethics rules to
different categories of client is not new. See, eg., Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Roles,
supra note 35, at 170-71 (discussing how "[a] unitary approach to legal ethics carries
with it several serious consequences").
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III. THE LAWYER'S ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS

Once it has been identified that a powerful client prone to selfrepresentation exists, what are the lawyer's ethical obligations when
dealing with this client? The first, of course, is to acknowledge the
likelihood that this client, confronting some legal difficulty, thinks it
likely that he can handle it best himself and may be likely to engage in
some degree of self-representation. From here, the principles that
might be controlling take us in somewhat different directions.
The first is the principle of equality: Clients should be treated
equally to the extent that such equality is possible.4" If the goal were
to treat clients equally, then there should be some attempt to equalize
the situations of the knowledgeable and the unsophisticated client. If
equality were the guiding principle, then the reason to be concerned
about the knowledgeable client would be that he is situated differently-for better or worse-than the naive client, and that some systematic attempt ought to be made to equalize the situations of the two
clients.
The principle of equality has intuitive appeal. Clients need lawyers
to level the playing field and provide the expertise in dealing with the
legal system that the traditional naive client typically lacks; there is
something troubling about providing representation that differs, in
some significant respect, based on the level of knowledge or sophistication the client brings to the attorney-client relationship. It seems
fairer to strive for a situation in which having a competent lawyer will
put a client in at least as good a position as he would have been in had
he himself possessed a sophisticated understanding of the law. At the
same time, the principle runs the risk of representation that focuses on
the needs of other clients, rather than this client.41
How could we give force to the equality principle and equalize the
situations of the knowledgeable and naive client? One possibility, as
some have suggested, is a routine "Miranda-type" warning to all clients explaining the pertinent rules, including the rules governing confidentiality and client perjury. 42 This would level the playing field
40. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct reflect some attempts in the direction of the "equality" value, one example being clients operating under a disability,

see supra note 37, where Model Rule 1.14 makes clear that the lawyer is to treat those
clients, to the extent possible, like any other client.
41. See Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on
Confidentiality,39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 441, 487 (1990) (desiring to avoid treating "clients
as groups rather than as individuals" and "'acting for the hypothetical client rather
than the one before him"' (quoting Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77
Mich. L. Rev. 1078, 1087 (1977)).
42. See Marvin E. Frankel, Clients' Perjuryand Lawyers' Options, 1 J. Inst. Study
Legal Ethics 25, 35 (1996) (discussing the need to disclose to clients the possibility
that their confidences will be disclosed if they perjure themselves and the lawyer
knows it: "[T]he client, entitled to the autonomy that was always to be respected and
is today properly extolled, has the right to a candidly advised choice. Autonomy also
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somewhat. But no five-minute script can eradicate the difference between a client with power, authority, and a legal education and a client who has been given a five-minute briefing by a lawyer in the context of what may be a terrifying and unfamiliar situation. Moreover,
while such warnings have equality benefits, they expand the potential
for client fabrication and manipulation. There is also a concern about
what such a warning does to the trust-building phase of the attorneyclient relationship. So some significant doubts exist about the utility
or appropriateness of giving the naive client equal information.
Another way to equalize the treatment of the two clients would be
to treat more skeptically information that came from a sophisticated
client who was aware of the pertinent rules. All else being equal, a
person who knows how to manipulate the rules of a game to his advantage is more likely to cheat than is a person who is unaware of
what the rules are. Applying that general rule to this particular situation, the odds are greater that the sophisticated client has tampered
with the information he has given to the lawyer. This would suggest
that it might be appropriate to treat this client's statements with more
skepticism. Perhaps in representing these clients, the lawyer should
have a duty of independent investigation, to further explore physical
and documentary evidence, to interview additional witnesses, and to
use other avenues to confirm the truth of what the client has said, because the client's knowledge maximizes his power to manipulate the
information given to his lawyer.
This is interesting, because it is the opposite of the bias under which
most of us operate. Imagine a lawyer-perhaps a public defenderrepresenting a client in a routine burglary case. The client assures the
lawyer that the case is one of mistaken identity and that he has an airtight alibi, notwithstanding circumstantial evidence that points
strongly to his guilt. Most of us would think that it would be a mistake
in judgment for the lawyer to accept on blind faith the client's assertion that he has an alibi and encourage the client to step forward and
tell it to the police. Most of us would say that the lawyer has some
obligation to investigate the facts, to determine whether the alibi is
plausible and consistent with the existing physical evidence, before
encouraging the client to tell his story to the cops.
Yet make the client the President, or another powerful and sophisticated individual, and all of a sudden we have our doubts about an
independent duty of investigation.43 Instead of viewing the client's
carries burdens, for clients and everyone. An informed judgment about whether to
tell the truth is a proper client responsibility."); see also Pizzimenti, supra note 41, at
487 (arguing that lawyers should have a duty to inform clients about limits on the duty
of confidentiality).
43. Consider Professor David Luban's analysis of why we might not want to modify the legal ethics rules to equate knowledge and ."conscious avoidance of actual
knowledge of the fact in question."' David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 Geo. U.
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story with skepticism, we are worried about undermining the relationship of trust and confidence between the lawyer and client.44 We are
worried about requiring the client to bear the costs of this adversarial
role his lawyer is going to play. We are worried about the lawyer's
role as advocate. We are worried about the client's autonomy and
control. Should not the client be able to define the scope of the representation?
Why do we view these two clients differently? It might be because
we do not have any faith that the burglar is making a competent decision,45 but we have faith in the competency of the powerful client. It
might be because we do not identify with the burglar in the same way
we do with the President; accordingly, we think the burglar is more
likely to lie. For whatever reason, the equality principle would suggest that our natural inclination to avoid this investigatory obligation
with more powerful and sophisticated clients is precisely backward. It
is the sophisticated client the lawyer should trust the least and check
up on the most.
As opposed to the principle of equality, we could adopt the second
governing principle of the attorney-client relationship: the autonomy
principle. This principle says that a client should be entitled to control
957, 976 (1999) (discussing possible amending language to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Terminology 9) (footnote omitted). He argues that this would fundamentally change the nature of legal practice-and that this would impact sophisticated clients:
Sophisticated clients with something to hide would have reason to actively
frustrate their own lawyers' factual investigation of their case, because they
would know that their lawyer is ethically required to ferret out guilty information that she might then be ethically required to disclose. (Under the current rule, if the client has something to hide, the lawyer can elect to leave
well enough alone, and the client can signal her to do so.) The worried client
may frustrate the lawyer's investigation even of innocent facts that the lawyer needs, because the client does not know the facts are innocent.
Id.
Meanwhile the lawyer in such a regime:
may be forced to play a cat-and-mouse game of sleuthing against her own
evasive clients. Adding to the tension is the fact that the client is paying by
the hour for his lawyer to investigate him-and the more the client tries to
frustrate the investigation, the more time-consuming and costly it becomes.
The lawyer has become an inspector-general attached to the client, at the
client's expense. The client retains the lawyer because he must, while viewing the lawyer askance, with a certain measure of dread and resentment.
The client fears, sometimes rightly, that he would be better off with no lawyer at all.
Id. at 976-77.
44. Similar concerns were raised under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
45. Frightened of conviction and unschooled (though not necessarily unsophisticated) about the criminal justice process, we think the client may poorly judge the
risks he exposes himself to by offering what may be a manufactured alibi. In contrast,
we are troubled by the notion that the President cannot make those decisions effectively and needs to be second-guessed by his own lawyers.
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his representation to the degree he is able. Powerful, sophisticated
clients will control their representation almost completely, but under
this principle the consequence is the appropriate one, considering who
the client is.
We spend a lot of time worrying about protecting and preserving
the autonomy of clients.' But for the most part, we are worried about
clients who do not have enough autonomy.47 The chorus of voices advocating for increased client autonomy is lodged in concerns about
client impotence, weakness, and inferior knowledge. 4 Clients who, by
virtue of class and social status or knowledge base, feel themselves to
be powerless in the relationship between lawyer and client are subject
to the lawyer's manipulation and control. Our interest in client
autonomy seems directed at protecting these clients and assuring them
the power to make their own choices.

Here, though, exactly the opposite is true. The powerful client has
maximum autonomy. The lawyer has no control over the client and
cannot exercise any dominion over the attorney-client relationship.

The lawyer's ability to provide adequate, competent representation is
threatened; without truthful and complete information, the lawyer's

representation is unlikely to be optimal. Worse yet, the lawyer knows
that, after the fact, he will be critiqued for pursuing a strategy shaped
and governed, in large part, by the client's ungovernable choices.
One answer to the argument that the client should be allowed to
46. "The autonomy view dominates the academic literature." William H. Simon,
Lawyer Advice and ClientAutonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 Md. L Rev. 213, 213 n.1
(1991).
47. Professor Fred Zacharias notes that differences in clients are "relevant to the
rationales that aggressive counsel is needed to serve the 'dignity' and the 'autonomy'
of their clients." Zacharias, ReconceptualizingRoles, supra note 35, at 187 n.87 (citing
Philip M. Gassell et al., Representing the Helpless: Toward an Ethical Guide for the
PerplexedAttorney, 5 W. St. U. L. Rev. 173,187 (1978)).
48. See eg., Camille A. Gear, The Ideology of Domination: Barriers to Client
Autonomy in Legal Ethics Scholarship, 107 Yale LJ. 2473 passim (1998). This article
focuses on client autonomy issues in the author's clinic representation of Ms. Scott, "a
thirty-five-year-old black woman who is HIV-positive, homeless, a substance abuser,
and a domestic violence survivor," who is trying to regain custody from the state of
her three-year-old HIV-positive son. Id. at 2474. The author expresses concern about
"whether an ethical attorney would help Ms. Scott pursue her wishes." Id. at 2475.
The author notes later that "[w]hile the ideology of domination affects all clients, regardless of their wealth and social power, poor clients may feel its effects most acutely
because such clients are likely to present moral problems with which the lawyer is unfamiliar." Id. at 2485. Her goal is to "transform the attorney-client relationship into a
space where a client can learn how to engage in autonomous moral decisionmaking."
Id. at 2500; see also Simon, supra note 46, at 225 (the debate about client autonomy
"expresses the anxiety that lawyers, especially those who represent clients socially distant from themselves, feel about getting to know their clients and about assuming responsibility for them"); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client
Relationships: The Argumentfor Autonomy, 65 N.C. L Rev. 315,336-37 (1987) ("Client decision making is an inherent good because it recognizes individual dignity and
personhood and the right of self-determination.... Making our own decisions affirms
our sense of personhood-it tells us who we are.").
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make his own choices is that the client may misperceive the lawyer's
role. A lawyer is useful not only because she is trained, but also because she is detached. A client who is certain he can manage his own
situation optimally may lack the objectivity and distance necessary to
make rational choices for himself. But perhaps a client who is fairly
apprised of this danger should be able to assess that situation and
make those decisions for himself.
One way to honor the autonomy value while addressing this problem would be to give the client a warning, one tailor-made for a
knowledgeable and sophisticated client. The warning could clearly
acknowledge the client's potential inclination to self-representation
and the client's power to control and manipulate the course of the
representation. The warning should point out the potential dangers of
doing so: that the client will, in effect, be operating without effective
legal advice; that the client may lack the objectivity and perspective
that the lawyer can provide; and that there is a danger of being found
out in untruths or distortions that may have more severe consequences than the truth. The warning can urge the importance of telling the lawyer all relevant information.
Such a warning interferes to some extent with the autonomy principle. First, the warning itself suggests that the client's decisions about
his case may be less than optimal; as such, it is a device of control and
manipulation in the attorney-client relationship. Second, it leaves an
open question: Is a lawyer always free, after the warning, to believe
the client and proceed on that basis unless presented with clear evidence to the contrary? Does such a warning strike the appropriate
balance between honoring a client's right to control the representation
and warning him of the dangers of self-representation? Such a client,
certain of his ability to outsmart his adversaries and to devise proper
strategies, may view controlling the information to his lawyer as the
best way to stay in control of the situation and maximize his options.
CONCLUSION

As I see it, we have two choices in dealing with sophisticated and
powerful clients. We can treat these sophisticated and powerful individuals with more suspicion, giving force to the equality principle; or
we can warn them frankly of the dangers of proceeding on their own
and then allow them to make their own choices, giving force to the
autonomy principle. As a practical matter, it will matter very little.
Either way, these powerful clients are likely to possess the power,
knowledge, and access to manipulate the lawyer's information, to
force the lawyer's hand, and to require the implementation of certain
strategies that would not be the lawyer's choice. Little that the lawyer
says or does will affect the attempt. In those circumstances, we should
think twice before we conclude that such a situation requires us to reconceptualize the role of lawyers in American scciety. Remember
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that it is not only lawyers, but also clients, who have the power to direct representation. Firing that gun twice at the lawyer may ignore
the most dangerous person in the room.

Notes & Observations

